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Abstract
Methods for learning and planning in sequen-
tial decision problems often assume the learner
is aware of all possible states and actions in
advance. This assumption is sometimes un-
tenable. In this paper, we give a method to
learn factored markov decision problems from
both domain exploration and expert assistance,
which guarantees convergence to near-optimal
behaviour, even when the agent begins un-
aware of factors critical to success. Our experi-
ments show our agent learns optimal behaviour
on small and large problems, and that conserv-
ing information on discovering new possibili-
ties results in faster convergence.
1 Introduction
Factored markov decision processes (FMDPs) are a fun-
damental tool for modelling complex sequential prob-
lems. When the transition and reward functions of an
FMDP are known in advance, there are tractable meth-
ods to learn its optimal policy via dynamic programming
[Guestrin et al., 2003]. When these components are un-
known, methods exist to jointly learn a structured model
of the transition and reward functions [Degris et al.,
2006, Araya-Lpez et al., 2011]. Yet all such methods
(with the exception of Rong [2016]) assume that the way
the domain of the problem is conceptualized—the possi-
ble actions available to the agent and the belief variables
that describe the state space—are completely known in
advance of learning. In many scenarios, this assumption
does not hold.
For example in medicine, suppose an agent prescribes
a particular drug, but later a senior pharmacologist ob-
jects to the prescription based on a reason unforeseen
by the agent—the patient carries a newly discovered ge-
netic trait, and the drug produces harmful side effects in
its carriers. Further, this discovery may occur after the
agent has already learned a lot about how other (fore-
seen) factors impact the drug’s effectiveness. As Coenen
et al. [2017] point out, such scenarios are common in hu-
man discussion—the answer to a person’s inquiry may
not only provide information about which of the ques-
tioner’s existing hypotheses are likely, but may also re-
veal entirely new hypotheses not yet considered. This
example also shows that while it may be infeasible for
an agent to gather all relevant factors of a problem before
learning, it may be easy for an expert to offer contextu-
ally relevant corrective advice during learning. Another
example is in robotic skill learning. Methods such as
Cakmak and Thomaz [2012] enable an expert to teach a
robot how to perform a new action, but don’t teach when
it’s optimal to use it. In lifelong-learning scenarios, we
want to integrate new skills into existing decision tasks
without forcing the robot to restart learning each time.
Current models of learning and decision making don’t
address these issues; they assume the task is to use data
to refine a distribution over a fixed hypothesis space. Un-
der this framework, any change to the set of possible hy-
potheses constitutes an unrelated problem. The above
examples, however, illustrate a sort of reverse bayesian-
ism [Karni and Viero, 2013], where the hypothesis space
itself expands over time.
Instead of overcoming unawareness of states and actions,
we could just represent unawareness as an infinite num-
ber of hidden states by modelling the problem as an in-
finite partially observable markov chain decision pro-
cess (iPOMDP) [Doshi-Velez, 2009]. This approach has
several drawbacks. First, iPOMDPs don’t currently ad-
dress what to do when an unforeseen action is discov-
ered. More importantly, since the hidden variables are
not tied to grounded concepts with explicit meaning, it
is difficult for an agent to justify its decisions to a user,
or to articulate queries about its current understanding of
the world so as to solicit help from an expert.
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We instead propose a system where an agent makes ex-
plicit attempts to overcome its unawareness while con-
structing an interpretable model of its environment. This
paper makes three contributions: First, an algorithm
which incrementally learns all components of an FMDP.
This includes the transition, reward, and value functions,
but also the set of actions and belief variables them-
selves (Section 3). Second, an expert-agent communi-
cation protocol (Section 3.1) which interleaves contex-
tual advice with learning, and guarantees our agent con-
verges to near-optimal behaviour, despite beginning un-
aware of factors critical to success. Third, experiments
on small and large sequential decision problems show-
ing our agent successfully learns optimal behaviour in
practice (Section 4).
2 The Learning Task
We focus on learning episodic, finite state FMDPs with
discrete states and actions. We begin with the formalisms
for learning optimal behaviour in FMDPs where the agent
is fully aware of all possible states and actions. We then
extend the task to one where the agent starts unaware of
relevant variables and actions, and show how the agent
overcomes this unawareness with expert aid.
2.1 Episodic Markov Decision Processes
An MDP is a tuple 〈S,Ss,Se, A, T ,R〉, where S and
A are the set of states and actions; Ss,Se ⊆ S are
possible start and end (terminal) states of an episode;
T : S × A × S → [0, 1] is the markovian transition
function P (s′|s, a), and R : S → R is the immediate
reward function.1 A policy pi : S × A → [0, 1] gives
the probability pi(s, a) that an agent will take action a in
state s. When referring to the local time m in episode
n, we denote the current state and reward by sm,n and
rm,n = R(sm,n). When referring to the global time t
across episodes, we denote them by st and rt.
The discounted return for episode n is: Gn =
∑T
i=0 γ
i ∗
ri,n, where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is the discount factor gov-
erning how strongly the agent prefers immediate re-
wards. The agent’s goal is to learn the optimal policy
pi+, which maximizes the expected discounted return in
all states. The value function Vpi(s) defines the expected
return when following a given policy pi, while the related
action-value function Qpi(s, a) gives the expected return
of taking action a in state s, and thereafter following pi.
1In this paper, we assume the agent’s preferences depend
only on the current state, and are both deterministic and sta-
tionary. Other works allow R to depend on the action and/or
resulting state (i.e.,R : S ×A× S → R).
Vpi(s) = R(s) + γ
∑
s′∈S
P (s′|s, pi(s))Vpi(s′) (1)
Qpi(s, a) = R(s) + γ
∑
s′∈S
P (s′|s, a)Vpi(s′) (2)
If T and R are known, we can compute pi+ via value
iteration [Sutton and Barto, 1998]. Further, we can mea-
sure the expected loss in discounted return of following
policy pi versus pi+ using (3), which we refer to as the
policy error. If the agent’s policy is unknown, we can
approximate the policy error using (4):
Err(pi) =
∑
s0∈Ss
P (s0)(Vpi+(s0)− Vpi(s0)) (3)
Err(t, t+ k) = (
∑
s0∈Ss
P (s0)Vpi+(s))−
∑t+k
i=t G
i
k
(4)
If all episodes eventually terminate, then (4) will con-
verge to (3). If our agent is -greedy (that is, in all states,
has probability  > 0 of executing any action from A at
random), then termination in most MDPs is guaranteed:
Definition 1 (Proper Policy). A policy pi is proper if,
from all states s ∈ S , acting according to pi guarantees
one eventually reaches some terminal state s′ ∈ Se.
Lemma 1. If an MDP has a proper policy pi, then any
policy which is -greedy with respect to A is also proper.
2.2 Learning FMDPs when Fully Aware
If T or R are unknown, the agent must learn them
using the data D0:t = [d0, . . . , dt] gathered from do-
main interactions. At time t, the sequential trial dt =
〈st, at, st+1, rt+1〉 gives the current state st, action at,
resulting state st+1 and the reward rt+1 given on en-
tering st+1. FMDPs allow one to learn T for large
MDPs by representing states as a joint assignment to
a set of variables X = {X1, . . . , Xn} (Written as
S = v(X )). Similarly, the reward function is de-
fined as a function R : v(scope(R)) → R, where
scope(R) ⊆ X are variables which determine the re-
ward received in each state. To exploit conditional inde-
pendence, T is then represented by a Dynamic Bayesian
Network (DBN) [Dean and Kanazawa, 1989] for each ac-
tion. That is, T = {dbna1 , . . . dbnan}, where dbna =
〈Paa, θa〉. Here, Paa is a directed acyclic graph with
nodes {X1, . . . , Xn, X ′1, . . . X ′n} where, as is standard,
node Xi denotes the value of variable Xi ∈ X at the
current time, while X ′i denotes the same variable in the
next time step. For each X ′i , Pa
a
X′i
defines the parents of
X = 1
7 Y = 1
9 10
(a) Reward
X = 1
X': <0.9, 0.1> Y = 0
X': <0.5, 0.5> X': <0.6, 0.4>
(b) Conditional Probability
Figure 1: Example decision trees
X ′i . These are the only variables on which the value of
X ′i depends. We also make the common assumption that
our DBNs contain no synchronic arcs [Degris and Sigaud,
2010], meaning ∀X ′i ∀a,PaaX′i ⊆ {X1, . . . , Xn}.
This structure, along with the associated parameters θa,
allow us to write transition probabilities as a product of
independent factors: P (s′|s, a) = ∏X∈X θas′[X],s[Paa
X′ ]
.
Here, s[~Y ] is the projection of s onto the variables in ~Y ,
and θaX′=i,Paa
X′=j
denotes the probability of variable X
taking on value i given that the agent performs action a
when the variables PaaX′ have assignment j in the cur-
rent time step.2
Exploiting independence among belief variables doesn’t
guarantee a compact representation of Vpi . We must also
exploit the context-specific independencies between as-
signments by representing T and R as decision trees,
rather than tables of values.
Figure 1 shows an example decision tree for R and
P (X ′|X,Y ). The leaves are either rewards, or a dis-
tribution over the values of X ′. The non-leaves are test
nodes, which perform a binary test of the form (X = i?)
to check whether variable X ∈ X takes on the value i
in the current state. Notice that when X = 1 is true, the
distribution over X ′ is conditionally independent of Y .
Given trials D0:t, we can estimate the most likely DBN
structure, tree structure and parameters, then subse-
quently estimate Vpi+ via a series of steps. Equation (5)
is the Bayesian Dirichlet-Equivalent Score [Heckerman
et al., 1995], which estimates the posterior probability
P (PaaX′ |D0:t) that the true parents of X ′ are PaaX′ by
first integrating out all the possible parameters of the lo-
cal probability distribution.
P (PaaX′ |D0:t) ∝ P (PaaX′)
∫
θ
P (D0:t|θ)P (θ|PaaX′)
= P (PaaX′)
∏
j∈v(Paa
X′ )
β(Na1,j + α
a
1,j , . . . , N
a
m,j + α
a
m,j)
β(αa1,j , . . . , α
a
m,j)
(5)
2If the context is clear, we condense this notation to θai,j .
Here, NaX=i,Paa
X′=j
denotes the number of trials in D0:t
in which action a was taken in a state where the joint
assignment to PaaX′ was j, resulting in a state where X
has the value i. The α terms are the hyper-parameters
from the prior dirichlet distribution over parameters, and
act as “pseudo-counts” when data is sparse. The prior
P (PaaX′) is typically chosen to favour simple structures:
P (PaaX′) = ρ
|Paa
X′ |(1− ρ)|X |−|PaaX′ | (6)
Equation (6) penalizes DBNs with many dependencies by
attaching a cost ρ < 0.5 for each parent in PaaX′ . Note,
if the space of possible DBNs is too large, we can restrict
the parent sets considered reasonable by using common
pruning heuristics or, for example, restricting the maxi-
mum in-degree.
Given PaaX′ , we can then compute each variable’s most
likely conditional probability tree structure DTaX , re-
stricting node tests to members of PaaX′ :
P (DTaX |PaaX′ , D0:t) ∝ P (DTaX)P (D0:t|DTaX) (7)
P (D0:t|DTaX) =
∏
`∈Leaves(DTaX)
β(Na1|` + α
a
1|`, . . . , N
a
m|` + α
a
m|`)
β(αa1|`, . . . , α
a
m|`)
(8)
Rather than evaluating the probabilities of all possible
DT structures each step, we can incrementally update
the most likely DT as new trials arrive using incremental
tree induction (ITI), as described in Utgoff et al. [1997].
While we lack the space to describe ITI in detail here, the
algorithm broadly works by maintaining a single most-
likely tree structure, with counts for all potential test as-
signments cached at intermediate nodes. As new trials
arrive, the counts at relevant nodes become “stale”, as
there might now exist an alternative test which could re-
place the current one, resulting in a higher value for equa-
tion (7). If such a superior test exists, the test at this node
is replaced, and the tree structure is transposed to reflect
this change. We can also use ITI to learn a tree structure
forR based on the trials seen so far. The only difference
is that we use an information-gain metric to decide on
the best test nodes, rather than (7).
Finally, given DTaX , we compute the most likely parame-
ters at each leaf via (9), where Na.,j =
∑
i∈v(X)N
a
i,j :
E(θaX=i,Paa
X′=j
|D0:t, DTaX) =
Nai,j + α
a
i,j
Na.,j + α
a
.,j
(9)
Once our agent has a transition and reward tree, we can
then use structured value iteration (SVI) [Boutilier et al.,
2000]—a variant of value iteration which works with de-
cision trees instead of tables—to compute a compact rep-
resentation of Vpi+ . Algorithm 1 shows an outline of an
incremental version of SVI (iSVI) [Degris et al., 2006],
which allows the agent to gradually update its beliefs
about the optimal value function in response to incom-
ing trials. The algorithm takes the current estimate of
the reward and transition functions (Rt and Tt), along
with the previous estimate of the optimal value function
(Vt−1), and combines them to produce a new estimate for
each state-action function (Qat ), and value function (Vt).
For further details about the merge and reduce functions
used in SVI, consult Boutilier et al. [2000].
Algorithm 1 Incremental SVI [Degris et al., 2006]
1: function INCSVI(Rt, Tt, Vt−1)
2: ∀a ∈ A : Qat ← REGRESS(Vt−1, dbna,Rt)
3: Vt ← MERGE({Qat : ∀a ∈ A}) (using maxi-
mization as the combination function)
4: return {Vt, {∀a ∈ A : Qat }}
This section took an encapsulated approach to learn-
ing T (In contrast to a unified one in e.g., Degris et al.
[2006]). This means we separate the task of finding an
optimal DBN structure from the task of learning each
local DT structure. Such an approach significantly re-
duces the space of DTs that must be considered, but
more importantly, provides us with posterior distribu-
tions P (PaaX′ |D0:t) over parent structures. We will use
these posterior distributions in section 3.2 to conserve in-
formation when adapting to new discoveries.
3 Overcoming Unawareness
So far, we’ve assumed our agent was aware of all rele-
vant belief variables in X , all actions A, and all mem-
bers of scope(R). We now drop this assumption. From
here onward we denote the true set of belief variables,
actions, and reward scope as X+, A+ and scope+(R),
and the learner’s awareness of them at t as X t, At, and
scopet(R)
Suppose X+ = {X1, X2, X3}, X0 = {X1}, A+ =
{a, a′}, At = {a}. We assume the agent can’t observe
the value of variables it is unaware of. In the medical
example from before, if X3 corresponds to a particular
gene, then we assume the agent cannot detect the pres-
ence or absence of that gene if it is unaware that it exists.
Similarly, we assume the agent cannot perform an action
it is unaware of.3 As a consequence, at time t = 0, the
3This assumption, while reasonable, may always not hold
(E.g., an agent may lean on a button while unaware it is part of
the task).
agent does not directly observe the true trial d0, but rather
d0[X 0] = 〈s0[X 0], a0, s1[X 0], r0〉. The key point here is
that awareness of those missing factors may be crucial
to successfully learning an optimal policy. For exam-
ple, the transition between observed states may not obey
the markov property unless X2 is observed, the best ac-
tion may depend upon whether X3 is true, or the optimal
policy may sometimes involve performing a′. The next
sections aims to answer two main questions. First, by
what mechanisms can an agent discover and overcome
its own unawareness by asking for help? Second, when
an agent discovers a new belief variable or action, how
can they integrate it into their current model while con-
serving what they have learned from past experience?
3.1 Expert Guidance
Our agent can expand its awareness via advice from an
expert. Teacher-apprentice learning is common in the
real world, as it allows learners to receive contextually
relevant advice which may inform them of new concepts
they would not otherwise encounter.
This paper assumes the expert has full knowledge of the
true MDP, is cooperative, and infallible. Further, we
abstract away the complexity of grounding natural lan-
guage statements in a formal semantics and instead as-
sume that the agent and expert communicate via a pre-
specified formal language (though see e.g., Zettlemoyer
and Collins [2007] for work on this problem). We do
not, however, assume the expert knows the agent’s cur-
rent beliefs about the decision problem.
As argued in the introduction, the goal is to provide a
minimal set of communicative acts so that interaction
between the agent and expert proceeds analogously to
human teacher-apprentice interactions. Concretely, this
means we want our system to have two properties. First,
the expert should, for the most part, allow the agent
the opportunity to learn by themselves, interjecting only
when the agent is performing sufficiently poorly, or when
the agent explicitly asks for advice. Secondly, following
the gricean maxims of conversation [Grice, 1975], the
expert should provide non-exhaustive answers to queries,
giving just enough information to resolve the agent’s cur-
rent query. We want this because in real world tasks with
human experts it may be impossible to explain all details
of a problem due to the cognitive constraints of the expert
or costs associated with communication.
The next sections identify three types of advice whose
combination guarantee the agent behaves optimally in
the long run, regardless of initial awareness.
3.1.1 Better Action Advice
If the expert sees the agent perform a sub-optimal action,
it can tell the agent a better action it could have taken
instead. For example: “When it is raining, take your um-
brella instead of your sun hat”. Our goal is to avoid in-
cessantly interrupting the agent each time it makes a mis-
take, so we specify the following conditions for when the
agent is performing sufficiently poorly to warrant correc-
tion: Let t be the current (global) time step correspond-
ing to the mth step in the nth episode. Similarly, let t′,
m′, n′ be the time the expert last uttered advice. When
(10-12) hold, the expert utters advice of the form (13):
t− t′ > µ (10)
Err(n ′,n) > β ∨m > κ (11)
∃a′ ∈ A+, Qpi+(a′, sm,n) > Qpi+(am,n, sm,n) (12)
Qpi+(w
s
m,n, a
′) > Qpi+(w
s
m,n, am,n) (13)
Equation (10) ensures some minimum time µ has passed
since the expert last gave advice. Equation (11) en-
sures the expert won’t interrupt unless its estimate of the
agent’s policy error is above some threshold β, or if the
agent is unable to reach a terminal state after some rea-
sonable bound κ (which is required because the agent’s
unawareness of A+ may mean its current -greedy pol-
icy is not proper). If episode n is unfinished, the ex-
pert estimates the expected return via the heuristic Gn ≈∑m−1
i=0 γ
iri,n+γ
mVpi+(sm,n), i.e., we optimistically as-
sume the agent will follow pi+ from now on. Taken to-
gether, µ, κ and β describe the expert’s tolerance towards
the agent’s mistakes. Finally, (12) ensures a better action
a′ actually exists at this time step.
Equation (13) is the expert’s utterance, and the term
wsm,n in it requires explanation. On first thought, the
expert should utter Qpi+(sm,n, a
′) > Qpi+(sm,n, am,n),
explicitly stating the full description of sm,n. How-
ever, remember that the agent’s awareness, X t, may be a
tiny subset of X+. Uttering such advice may involve
enumerating a huge number of variables the agent is
currently unaware of. This is exactly the type of ex-
haustive explanation we wish to avoid, since such an
explanation may place a cognitive burden on the ex-
pert, or confuse a learner. Conversely, we could in-
stead have our expert project its intended utterance onto
only those variables X e for which the expert has ex-
plicit evidence the agent is aware of them (i.e., utter:
Qpi+(sm,n[X e], a′) > Qpi+(sm,n[X e], am,n)). This can
be understood by the agent without being made aware
of any new variables, but might violate our assumption
that the expert is truthful. For example, if ∃s′, s′[X e] =
sm,n[X e], but Qpi+(s′, a) > Qpi+(s′, a′).
The solution is to use a sense ambiguous term ws,
whose intended denotation is the true state s (i.e JwsK ∈
v(X+)), but whose default interpretation by the agent is
s[X t]. In words, it is as if the expert says “In the last
step, it would have been better to do a′ than am,n”.
Thus, by introducing ambiguity, the agent can interpret
the advice in two ways. The first is as a partial descrip-
tion of the true problem, which is monotonically true re-
gardless of what it learns in future. On hearing (13), the
agent adds (14-15) to its knowledge:
a′ ∈ A+ (14)
∃s, s[X t] = sm,n[X t] ∧Qpi+(s, a′) > Qpi+(s, am,n)
(15)
Additionally however, the agent can choose to add its
current default interpretation of the advice to its accu-
mulated knowledge:
Qpi+(s[X t], a′) > Qpi+(s[X t], a) (16)
The agent can then act on the expert’s advice directly by
choosing a′ whenever s[X t] = sm,n[X t], regardless of
what seems likely fromD0:t. We can see that even with a
cooperative and infallible expert, even abstracting away
issues of grounding natural language, misunderstandings
can still happen due to differences in agent and expert
awareness. As the next section shows, such misunder-
standings can reveal gaps in the agent’s awareness and
help to articulate queries whose answers guarantee the
agent expands its awareness.
Lemma 2 guarantees the expert’s advice strategy reveals
unforeseen actions to the agent so long as its perfor-
mance in trials exceeds the expert’s tolerance.4
Lemma 2. Consider an FMDP where pi+ is proper, an
agent with awareness X t ⊆ X+, At ⊂ A+, and expert
acting with respect to (10-13). If ∃a ∈ image(pi+), a /∈
At then as k →∞, either Err(t, t+ k)→ c with c ≤ β
or the expert utters (12) such that a′ /∈ At.
3.1.2 Resolving Misunderstandings
We noted before that the agent’s defeasible interpretation
of expert advice could result in misunderstandings. To
illustrate, suppose the agent receives advice (17) and (18)
at times t− k and t:
Qpi+(w
s
t−k, a) > Qpi+(w
s
t−k, a
′) (17)
Qpi+(w
s
t , a) < Qpi+(w
s
t , a
′) (18)
4Proofs of lemmas/theorems are in the technical supplement
While the intended meaning of each statement is true,
the agent’s default interpretations of wst−k and w
s
t may
be identical. That is, st−k[X t] = st[X t]. From the
agent’s perspective, (17) and (18) conflict, and thus give
the agent a clue that its current awareness of X+ is de-
ficient. To resolve this conflict, the agent asks (19) (in
words, “which X has distinct values in st−k and st?”)
and receives an answer of the form (20):
?λX(X ∈ X+ ∧ st−k[X] 6= st[X]) (19)
X ∈ X+ (20)
Notice there may be multiple variables in X+ \ X t
whose assignments differ in st−k and st. Thus, the ex-
pert’s answer can be non-exhaustive, providing the min-
imum amount of information to resolve the agent’s con-
flict without necessarily explaining all components of the
task. This means the agent must abandon its previous
defeasible interpretation of (16), but can keep (14-15),
as these are true regardless of known variables. Lemma
3 guarantees the expert will reveal new belief variables,
provided such misunderstandings can still arise.
Lemma 3. Consider an FMDP where pi+ is proper and
an agent with awareness X t ⊂ X+, image(pi+) ⊆
At ⊆ A+. If ∃s∃s′ 6= s, s[X t] = s′[X t], and pi+(s) 6=
pi+(s
′), then as k → ∞, either Err(t, t + k) → c
(c ≤ β), or the expert utters (20) such that X /∈ X t
3.1.3 Unexpected Rewards
In typical FMDPs (where the agent is assumed fully aware
of X+, A+, and scope+(R)), we tend only to think of
the trials as providing counts, but for an unaware agent,
a trial dt = 〈st, at, st+1, rt+1〉 also encodes monotonic
information:
∃s, s[X t] = st+1 ∧R+(s) = rt+1 (21)
This constrains the form of R the agent must learn. Re-
call that scopet(R), may be only a subset scope+(R),
so it might be impossible to construct an R :
v(scopet(R))→ R satisfying all descriptions (21) gath-
ered so far. Further, those extra variables in scope+(R)\
scopet(R) may not be in X t. To resolve this, if the agent
fails to construct a valid reward function, it asks (22) (in
words, “which variable X (that I don’t already know) is
in scope(R)?”), receiving an answer (23):
?λX(X ∈ scope+(R)
∧
X′∈scopet(R)
X 6= X ′) (22)
X ∈ scope+(R) ∧X ∈ X+ (23)
Again, the agent may be unaware of many variables in
scope+(R), so (23) may be non exhaustive. Even so, we
can guarantee that the agent’s learned reward function
eventually equalsR+:
Lemma 4. Consider an FMDP where pi+ is proper
and an agent with awareness At ⊆ A+, X t ⊆ X+,
scopet(R) ⊆ scope+(R). As k → ∞, there exists a
K such that for all k ≥ K, Rt+k(s) = R+(s) for all
states s reachable using At.
3.2 Adapting the Transition Function
Section 3.1 showed three ways the agent could expand
its awareness of X , A, and scope(R). If we wish to im-
prove on the naive approach of restarting learning when
faced with such expansions, we must now specify how
the agent adapts T andR to such discoveries.
Adapting T upon discovering a new action a′ at time t
is simple: Since the agent hasn’t performed a′ in any
previous trial, it can just create a new DBN, dbna′ , using
the priors outlined in section 2.2. Our new model at time
t then becomes T = {dbnta1 , . . . dbntan} ∪ {dbna′}.
The more difficult issue is adapting T upon discovering
a new belief variable Z. The main problem is that the
agent’s current distributions over DBNs no longer cover
all possible parent sets for each variable, nor all DTs. For
example, the current distribution over PaaX′ does not in-
clude the possibility that Z is a parent of X ′. Worse,
since we assume in general that the agent cannot observe
Z’s past values in D0:t, it cannot observe the true value
of NaZ=i|j , nor N
a
X=i|Paa
X′=j
when Z ∈ PaaX′ . The α-
parameters involving Z are also undefined, yet we need
them to calculate structure probabilities (5, 7) and pa-
rameters via (9).
The problem is that new variables make the size of each
(observed) state dynamic, in contrast to standard prob-
lems where they are static (e.g., 〈X1 = 0, X2 = 1〉 be-
comes 〈X1 = 0, X2 = 1, Z =?〉 ) . We could phrase
this as a missing data problem: Z was hidden in the
past but visible in future states, so treat the problem as a
POMDP and estimate missing values via e.g., expectation
maximization [Friedman, 1998]. However, such methods
commit us to costly passes over the full state-action his-
tory, and make it hard to learn DT structures with enough
sparseness to ensure a compact value function. Alterna-
tively, we could ignore states with missing information
when counts involving Z are required. For example, we
could use P (PaaX′ |Dt:n) to scorePaaX′ whenZ ∈ PaaX′
but use P (PaaX′ |D0:n) when Z /∈ PaaX′ . However, as
Friedman and Goldszmidt [1997] points out, most struc-
ture scores, including (5), assume we evaluate models
with respect to the same data. If two models are com-
pared using different data sets (even if they come from
the same underlying distribution), the learner tends to
favour the model evaluated with the smaller amount of
data. Instead, our method discards the data gathered dur-
ing the learner’s previous deficient view of the hypothe-
sis space, but conserves the relative posterior probabili-
ties learned from past data to construct new priors for the
Paa, DTa and θa in the expanded belief space.
3.2.1 Parent Set Priors
On discovering Z, the agent must update P (PaaX′) for
each X 6= Z and a ∈ At to include parent sets contain-
ing Z. In (24) we construct a new prior P ′(PaaX′) using
the old posterior:
P ′(PaaX′) =
{
(1− ρ)P (PaaX′ |D0:t) if Z /∈ PaaX′
ρP ((PaaX′ \ Z)|D0:t) otherwise
(24)
This preserves the likelihoods among the parent sets that
do not include Z. It also maintains our bias towards sim-
pler structures by re-assigning only a portion ρ of the
probability mass to parent sets including Z. To define
P (PaaZ′)—the distribution over parent sets for the newly
discovered variable Z—we default to (6), since the agent
has no evidence (yet) concerning Z’s parents.
3.2.2 Decision Tree and Parameter Priors
We must also update P (DTaX |PaaX′), and
P (θaX,Paa
X′
|PaaX′) to accommodate Z. Here, we
return to the issue of the counts Nai|j and the associated
α-parameters. As mentioned earlier, we wish to avoid
the complexity of estimating Z’s past values. Instead,
we throw away the past counts of Nai|j , but retain the
relative likelihoods they gave rise to by packing these
into new α-parameters, as shown in (25-26):
αaX=i|Y=j :=
{
K
|v(Z∪Y )| if X = Z
K
|v(Y )|P (i, j[Y \ Z]|dbnta) else
(25)
P ′(DTaX′ |PaaX′) ∝
∏
`∈leaves(DTa
X′ )
β(αaX′=1|`, . . . , α
a
X′=n|`) (26)
Equation (25) summarizes D0:t via inferences on the
old best DBNs, then encodes these inferences in the
new α-parameters. The revised α-parameters ensure the
new tree structure prior and expected parameters defined
via (26) and (9) bias towards models the agent previ-
ously thought were likely. Indeed, the larger the (user-
specified) K parameter is, the more the distributions
learned before discovering Z influence the agent’s rea-
soning after discovering Z.
3.3 Adapting Reward and Value Trees
On becoming aware Z is part of scope+(R), the agent
may wish to restructure its reward tree. This is because
awareness that Z ∈ scope+(R) means there are tests of
the form Z = i that the agent has not yet tried which
may produce a more compact tree. In the language of
ITI, the current test nodes are “stale”, and must be re-
checked to see if a replacement test would yield a tree
with better information gain. If the agent was unaware
of Z (i.e, Z /∈ X t), we can still test on assignments to Z
by following the ITI convention that any state where Z is
missing automatically fails any test on Z.
Once we have updated T andR, there is no need to make
further changes to Vt in response to a new action a′ or
variable Z. In effect, this encodes our conservative in-
tuition that the true Vpi+ is more likely to be closer to
the agent’s current estimate Vt than some arbitrary value
function. The agent essentially assumes (in absence of
further information) that the value of a state is indiffer-
ent to this newly discovered factor. In subsequent trials
where the agent performs a′ or observes Z, algorithm 1
ensures information about this new factor is incorporated
into the agent’s value function.
Algorithm 2 Learning FMDPs with Unawareness
1: function LEARNFMDPU(A0, X 0, T0, Q0, V0, s0)
2: for t = 1 . . .maxTrials do
3: 〈st, rt〉 ← -GREEDY(st−1, Qt−1, adv0:t−1)
4: 〈Tt,Rt〉 ← Add 〈st, rt〉 via (5-9) & ITI
5: if Update toRt fails then
6: Z ← Ask expert (19)
7: 〈scopet(R),X t〉 ← Append Z to each
8: Rt ← Update via ITI
9: if (10-12) are true then
10: adv t ← Expert advice of form (13)
11: if advt mentions action a′ /∈ At−1 then
12: At ← At−1 ∪ {a′}
13: Tt ← Tt−1 ∪ {dbna′} made via (6)
14: if adv0:t−1 conflicts with advt then
15: Z ← Ask expert (19)
16: X t ← X t−1 ∪ {Z}
17: if X t−1 6= X t then
18: Tt ← Update via (25, 5, 26, 7, 9)
19: 〈Vt, Qt〉 ← INCSVI(Rt, Tt,Vt−1)
Algorithm 2 outlines how the agent updates T ,R, and V
in response to new data and expert advice. Given algo-
rithm 2, theorem 1 guarantees our agent behaves indis-
tinguishably from a near-optimal policy in the long run,
regardless of initial awareness (provided allX ∈ X+ are
relevant to expressing the optimal policy).
Theorem 1. Consider an FMDP where pi+ is proper and
an agent with initial awareness X 0 ⊆ X+, A0 ⊆ A+,
and scope0(R) ⊆ scope+(R) acts according to algo-
rithm 2. If for all X ∈ X+, there exists a pair of states
s, s′ such that s[X+ \X] = s′[X+ \X], s[X] 6= s′[X],
and pi+(s) 6= pi+(s′), then as t → ∞, Err(0, t) → c
such that c ≤ β
4 Experiments and Results
Our experiments show that agents following algorithm 2
converge to near-optimal behaviour in both theory and
practice. Further, we show that conserving information
on T and V gathered before each new discovery allows
our agent learn faster than one which abandons this infor-
mation. We do not investigate assigning an explicit bud-
get to agent-expert communication, leaving this to future
work. However we do show how varying the expert’s
tolerance affects the agent’s performance.
We test agents on two well-known problems: Coffee-
Robot and Factory.5 In each, our agent begins with only
partial awareness of X+, A+ and scope+(R). The agent
takes actions for T time steps, using an -greedy policy
( = 0.1). When the agent enters a terminal state, we re-
set it to one of the initial states randomly. We use the cu-
mulative reward across all trials as our evaluation metric,
which acts as a proxy for the quality of the agent’s policy
over time. To make the results more readable, we apply
a discount of 0.99 at each step, resulting in the metric
Rdisct = rt + 0.99 ∗Rdisct−1 .
We test several variants of our agent to show the effec-
tiveness of our approach. The default agent follows al-
gorithm 2 as is, with parameters ρ = 0.1, K = 5.0,
µ = 10, β = 0.1, κ = 50 in equations (6), (24), (25),
and (10-12) respectively. The nonConservative agent
does not conserve information about V , nor T via (24-
26) when a new factor is discovered. Instead, it resets
V and T to their initial values. This agent is included
to show the value of conserving past information as X
and A expand. The truePolicy and random agents start
with full knowledge of the true FMDP, and execute an -
greedy version of pi+, or a choose random action respec-
tively. These agents provide an upper/lower bound on
performance. The lowTolerance / highTolerance agents
change the expert’s tolerance to β = 0.01 and β = 0.5.
5Full specifications at https://cs.uwaterloo.ca/
˜jhoey/research/spudd/index.php
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Figure 2: Cumulative Rewards. Shaded areas represent
standard error from the mean.
4.1 Coffee Robot
Coffee-Robot is a small sequential problem where a
robot must purchase coffee from a cafe, then return it
to their owner. Also, the robot gets wet if it has no
umbrella when it rains. The problem has 6 boolean
variables—HUC (user has coffee), HRC (robot has cof-
fee), R (raining), W (wet), L (location), U (umbrella)—
and 4 actions—MOVE, DELC, BUYC and GETU— mak-
ing 256 state/action pairs. The terminal states are those
where HUC = 1; initial states are all non-terminal ones.
Our agent has initial awareness A0 = {MOVE}, X 0 =
scope0(R) = {HUC} and discount factor γ = 0.8.6
Figure 2a shows each agent’s (discounted) cumulative
reward. Despite starting unaware of factors critical to
success, the default agent quickly discovers the relevant
actions and beliefs with the expert’s aid, and converges
on the optimal policy. The non-conservative agent also
learns the optimal policy, but takes longer. This shows
the value of conserving T and V on discovering new
beliefs. We also see how expert tolerance affects per-
formance. The agent paired with high tolerance expert
learns a (marginally) worse final policy, but this makes
little difference to cumulative reward. Figure 3 shows
why: The agent learned a “good enough” policy, so the
expert doesn’t reveal the “get umbrella” (GETU) action,
which yields only a minor increase in reward. Figure
4 supports this explanation, showing how more tolerant
experts reveals less variables over time.
6Original setting was γ = 0.9. Changed to make pi+ proper.
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Figure 3: Typical final policy depending on tolerance
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Figure 4: Awareness of |X+| and |A+|
4.2 Factory
Factory is a larger problem (|A+| = 14, X+ = 14,
774144 state/action pairs), which shows our method
works on more realistically sized tasks. Here, an agent
must shape, paint and connect two widgets to create
products of varying quality. Some actions (like bolting)
produce high quality products, whereas others (like glu-
ing) produce low quality products. The agent receives a
higher reward for producing goods which match the de-
manded quality.7. The terminal states are those where
CONNECTED = 1; initial states are non-terminals where
it is possible to connect two components. Our agent’s ini-
tial awareness is X 0 = scope0(R) = {CONNECTED},
A0 = {BOLT, GLUE, DRILLA, DRILLB}, with γ = 0.9.
This represents a simplified task where the agent thinks
the only goal is connecting the widgets.
Figure 2b shows results similar to previous experiments.
The default agent converges on optimal behaviour, and
does so quicker than the non-conservative agent. Varying
the expert’s tolerance now has a larger effect on the rate
at which factors are discovered and on convergence to-
wards the optimal policy (presumably because there are
many more unforeseen variables/actions the agent can
discover in this larger problem).
7Rewards were scaled to range 0.0-1.0 and, to make pi+
proper, terminal states which previously gave 0 reward were
given a small reward of 0.01.
5 Related Work
Models of unawareness exist in logic and game theory
[Board et al., 2011, Heifetz et al., 2013, Feinberg, 2012],
but interpret (un)-awareness from an omniscient view.
We instead model awareness from the agent’s view and
offer methods to overcome one’s own unawareness.
Rong [2016] defines unawareness similarly to us, using
markov decision processes with unawareness (MDPUs)
to learn optimal behaviour when an agent starts unaware
of some actions. They apply MDPUs to a robotic-motion
problem with around 1000 discretised atomic states. The
agent uses an explore move, which randomly reveals use-
ful motions they were previously unaware of. Our work
differs from theirs in several ways. First, we provide a
concrete mechanism for discovering unforeseen factors
via expert advice, rather than random discovery from the
agent’s own exploration. Second, we allow the agent
to discover explicit belief variables rather than atomic
states, and focus more on exploiting the inherent struc-
ture in problems with a large number of features. This
enables us to scale up to complex decision problems,
where the agent converges on an optimal policies in a
(true) state space around a million atomic states, as op-
posed to around 1000. McCallum and Ballard [1996]
also learn an increasingly complex representation of the
state space by gradually distinguishing between states
which yield different rewards. Rather than dealing with
unawareness, their approach focusses on refining an ex-
isting state space. In other words, they do not support
introducing unforeseen states or actions that the learner
was unaware of before learning.
Several works use expert interventions to improve perfor-
mance via reward shaping and corrections [Stone, 2009,
Torrey and Taylor, 2013]. Yet all such methods assume
the expert’s intended meaning can be understood with-
out expanding the agent’s current state and action space.
Our work allows experts to utter advice where ambiguity
arises from their greater awareness of the problem.
6 Conclusion
We have presented an agent-expert framework for learn-
ing optimal behaviour in both small and large FMDPs
even when one starts unaware of factors critical to suc-
cess. Further, we’ve shown that conserving one’s be-
liefs helps improve the effectiveness of learning. In fu-
ture work, we aim to lift some assumptions imposed on
the expert, and expand the expressiveness of its advice.
For instance, we could let the expert be fallible, or allow
questions on the structure of T , as Masegosa and Moral
[2013] do for Bayesian Networks.
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